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et al.: FRE and NY Evidence Comparison

RULE 801(d)(1): PRIOR STATEMENT BY
WITNESS
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1) states:
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay
if(1) Prior statement by a witness. The declarant testifies at the
trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning
the statement, and the statement is (A) inconsistent with the
declarant's testimony, and was given under oath subject to the
penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a
deposition, or (B) consistent with the declarant's testimony and is
offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the
declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive,
or (C) one of identification of a person made after perceiving the
person.... 1
Federal Rule 801(d)(1) provides for three situations where outof-court statements by a witness are excluded from the hearsay
rule. Such out-of-court statements include prior inconsistent
statements, prior consistent statements and statements identifying
a person. 2 The drafters of Federal Rule 801(d)(1) determined that
it was essential that the witness be present to testify at trial and
available for cross-examination regarding his or her out-of-court
statement. 3 The underlying rationale behind this rule is that prior
statements of a witness may be admitted into evidence in those
4
situations in which there is a guarantee of reliability.

1. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(1).
2. Id.
3. GLEN

WEISSENBERGER,

WEISSENBERGER'S

FEDERAL

EVIDENCE

§ 801.13 at 408 (2d ed. 1995).
4. Id.
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801(d)(1) (A): Inconsistent Statements
Under Federal Rule 801(d)(1)(A), prior inconsistent statements
may be used for impeachment purposes, as well as substantive
evidence, as long as the requirements of the rule have been
satisfied: the statement was inconsistent with declarant's
testimony and the statement was given under oath. However,
even if a prior inconsistent statement does not satisfy Rule
801(d)(1)(A), the statement may still be available for
impeachment purposes, provided the jury is instructed as to the
limited nature of the prior statement. 5 Nevertheless, if the prior
inconsistent statements comply with the language of the rule, then
the statements may be used for impeachment purposes as well as
substantive evidence, and no limiting jury instruction is
6
necessary.
In United States v. Marchand,7 for example, the witness's
grand jury testimony, which indicated that the defendant was a
marijuana supplier, was admissible at trial as substantive
evidence after the witness claimed that he could not identify the
defendant as the supplier. 8 The court explained that "if a witness
has testified to such facts before a grand jury and forgets or
denies them at trial, his grand jury testimony or any fair
representation of it falls squarely within Rule 801(d)(1)(A)." 9
New York's approach to the admissibility of prior inconsistent
statements is different from the Federal Rule. New York
Criminal Procedure Law [hereinafter C.P.L.] section 60.3510 and

5. Id. at 409; see also FED. R. EVID. 613.
6. See WEISSENBERGER, supra note 3, § 801.14, at 409-10; FED. R.
EvID. 105.

7. 564 F.2d 983 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1015 (1977).
8. Id.at 998.
9.Id.at 999.
10. N.Y. CPmI. PRoc. LAW § 60.35 (McKinney 1992). The statute
provides in pertinent part:

1. When, upon examination by the party who called him, a witness in a
criminal proceeding gives testimony upon a material issue of the
case which tends to disprove the position of such party, such party
may introduce evidence that such witness has previously made
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New York Civil Practice Law and Rules section 4514,11 permit

the introduction of prior inconsistent statements for impeachment
purposes, but not as substantive evidence. In civil cases, New

York has, however, distinguished between the admissibility of
prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence when the
witness is not present, as opposed to when the witness is present.
In People v. Welch, 12 the court addressed the admissibility of
prior inconsistent statements in criminal cases. The court noted
that while section 8-a of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the
predecessor to C.P.L. 60.35, "enlarge[s] the field in which
impeachment of a witness by proof of prior inconsistent
statements is permitted... the statute does not in express terms

or by fair implication provide that such proof may be introduced
for purposes other than impeachment of a witness." 3
Further, in Roge v. Valentine, 14 the New York Court of
Appeals addressed this issue in the context of civil cases when
the witness was not present. In Roge, the court stated: "'[it is
universally maintained by the courts that prior self-contradictions
are not to be treated as having any substantixe or independent
either a written statement signed by him or an oral statemen under
oath contradictory to such testimony.
2. Evidence concerning a prior contradictory statement introduced
pursuant to subdivision one may be received only for the purpose
of impeaching the credibility of the witness with respect to his
testimony upon the subject, and does not constitute evidence in
chief. Upon receiving such evidence at a jury trial, the court must
so instruct the jury.
Id.
11. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 4514 (McKinney 1992). Section 4514
provides: "In addition to impeachment in the manne permitted by common
law, any party may introduce proof that any witness has made a prior
statement iconsisteat with his testimony if the statement was mae in a

writing subscribed by him or was mae der oatL" Id.
12. 16 A.D.2d 554,229 N.Y.S.2d 909 (4th De't 1962).
13. Id. at 558, 229 N.Y.S.2d at 913. See also People v. Ward, 160
A.D.2d 473, 474, 554 N.Y.S.2d 32, 33 (Ist Dep't 1990) (affirming trial
court's refusal to allow tape of comlainant's 911 phonm calls where tape

would only serve

purposes and the compUlainant did not testify).

14. 280 N.Y. 268, 20 N.E.2d 751 (1939):
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The court explained that prior oral or

written contradictory statements made under oath inside or
outside of court may be introduced to impeach the credibility of
the witness, but will not "constitute affirmative evidence or
'evidence in chief' of the facts stated." 16
In Letendre v. Hartford Accident Indemnity Co.,17 the court of
appeals held that, although the witness's prior statements were
hearsay, the statements were properly admitted as substantive
evidence to be evaluated by the jury. 18 The court based its

decision on the fact that the "[d]eclarant himself was present in
court, [and] subject to the oath and safeguard of crossexamination."

19

Hence, in New York, the trend is to allow the

admission of prior statements as substantive evidence in civil
cases when the declarant is present in court, under oath and
subject to cross-examination. 20
Thus, while the Federal Rules of Evidence allow prior
inconsistent statements, made at a hearing under oath, of

testifying witnesses to be admitted at trial as substantive evidence
and for impeachment purposes, the New York evidentiary

15. Id. at 277, 20 N.E.2d at 754 (citations omitted).
16. Id. at 276, 20 N.E.2d at 754.
17. 21 N.Y.2d 518, 524, 236 N.E.2d 467, 470, 289 N.Y.S.2d 183, 188
(1968).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. See People v. Arnold, 34 N.Y.2d 548, 550, 309 N.E.2d 875, 354
N.Y.S.2d 106, 107 (1974) (stating that "the hearsay doctrine has been too
restrictively applied to exclude otherwise reliable evidence from the jury");
Campbell v. Elmira, 198 A.D.2d 736, 738, 604 N.Y.S.2d 609, 611 (3d Dep't
1993) (holding that, in a civil action, "inconsistent prior sworn testimony could
be considered by the jury as evidence-in-chief'); Cohen v. St. Regis Paper
Co., 99 A.D.2d 659, 661, 471 N.Y.S.2d 926, 929 (4th Dep't 1984)
(acknowledging the New York trend to "relax the strict requirements of the
hearsay rule"); Whitman Delicatessen, Inc. v. State Liquor Auth., 83 A.D.2d
963, 964, 443 N.Y.S.2d 14, 16 (2d Dep't 1981) (finding, in a civil action,
authority for the admissibility of prior inconsistent statements as evidence-inchief); Vincent v. Thompson, 50 A.D.2d 211, 224, 377 N.Y.S.2d 118, 130
(2d Dep't 1975) (noting that the court of appeals had recently found the
application of the hearsay doctrine too restrictive in Arnold and Letendre).
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scheme remains opposed to such an approach other than in civil
cases where the declarant meets the criteria set forth in Letendre.
801 (d)(1) (B): Consistent Statements
Under Federal Rule 801(d)(1)(B), prior consistent statements of
a witness may only be used to rehabilitate the credibility of a
witness. This hearsay exemption applies where the statement is
"offered to rebut an express or implied charge of recent
fabrication or improper influence or motive." 2 1 In such
instances, the prior consistent statements are introduced to
support the credibility of the witness and counter the attempted
impeachment. The witness must be subject to cross-examination
at the proceeding, although the actual oath or cross-examination
is not absolutely necessary. 22
In United States v. Quinto,23 the Second Circuit stated that the
proponent of evidence of a prior consistent statement must
demonstrate three things: (1) the prior consistent statement
sought to be admitted is consistent with the witness' in-court
testimony; (2) "the prior consistent statement... is being
'offered to rebut an express or implied charge against [the
witness] of recent fabrication or improper influence or
motive;'" 24 and (3) the prior consistent statement "was made
prior to the time that the supposed motive to falsify arose." 25
Federal Rule 801(d)(1)(B), however, is silent as to this third
condition.
21. FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(1)(B).
22. See WEiSSENBERGER, supra, note 3, § 801.14, at 410 ("IMihe witness

must be subject to cross-examination at the proceeding at which the prior
consistent statement is offered regarding both his trial testimony and the earlier
statement."); see akso FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(1)(B) Report of Senate
Committee on the Judiciary. ("The requirement that the statement be under
oath also appears unnecessary. Notwithstanding the absence of an oath
contemporaneous with the statement, the witness, when on the stand.
qualifying or denying the prior statement, is under oath.").
23. 582 F.2d 224 (2d Cir. 1978).
24. Id. at 234 (citations omitted).

25. Id. (citations omitted).
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In Tome v. United States,26 the United States Supreme Court
recently addressed the question of whether a prior consistent
statement must be made before an alleged fabrication, influence
or motive has arisen. 27 Resolving a split in the circuits, the Court
held that a prior consistent statement may be admitted into
evidence only if the statement was made before a motive to
fabricate or influence originated. 28 In reaching its decision, the
Court relied on the Advisory Committee's Note. 2 9 The Court

stated that "it [was] difficult to imagine that the drafters, who
noted the new substantive use of prior consistent statements,
would have remained silent if they intended to modify the
30
premotive requirement."
New York's approach to the admissibility of prior consistent

statements for substantive purposes closely parallels the federal
premotive rule. In People v. Davis,3 1 the New York Court of

Appeals stated that "[i]t is now firmly settled in this State that an
impeached witness cannot be rehabilitated by his antecedent
consistent statements unless the cross-examiner has created the
inference of, or directly characterized the testimony as, a recent
fabrication." 32 The court explained that "prior consistent
statements made at a time when there was no motive to falsify are
26. 115 S. Ct. 696 (1995). In Tome, the government attempted to
introduce prior consistent statements by defendant's daughter of alleged sexual
abuse. Id. at 699-70. The defendant asserted that the statements were
inadmissible under Federal Rule 801(d)(1), since they were made after her
alleged improper motive to fabricate such statements arose. Id.
27. Id. at 699.
28. Id. at 700.
29. Id. at 702.
30. Id. at 703.
31. 44 N.Y.2d 269, 376 N.E.2d 901, 405 N.Y.S.2d 428 (1978). In Davis,
a police report was offered by the prosecution to rehabilitate an undercover
police officer's testimony with respect to events that transpired during a drug
buy operation. Id. at 277, 376 N.E.2d at 905, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 432. The court
held that the prior consistent statement was inadmissible under the hearsay rule
because the report was not shown by the prosecution to have been made prior
to the time that a motive to fabricate such information would have arisen. Id.
at 278, 376 N.E.2d at 905, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 433.
32. Id. at 277, 376 N.E.2d at 905, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 432 (citations
omitted).
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admissible to repel the implication or charge." 33 Hence, New
York requires a similar premotive limitation.
801 (d)(1) (C): Identification

Under Federal Rule 801(d)(1)(C), a witness' out-of-court
statements of identification are exempted from the hearsay
definition. A witness' out-of-court statement of identification may
be used as substantive evidence provided that the declarant
testifies at the trial and is subject to cross-examination concerning
the identification. 34 The rationale behind the rule is that
identifications made prior to trial may be more trustworthy than
identification made during trial. 35 The Advisory Committee's
Note stated that the exemption hinges on the "unsatisfactory and
inconclusive nature of courtroom identifications as compared
with those made at an earlier time under less suggestive
conditions."36
In United States v. Owens,37 the United States Supreme Court

held that prior statements of identification may be introduced into
evidence even if the witness claims a lack of memory concerning
the prior identification. The Court explained that the rule was
satisfied by the opportunity to cross-examine the witness about
his memory loss. 38 The Court stated that the adoption of the
Federal Rule was, in part, meant to deal with situations in which
"memory loss ... makes it impossible for the witness to provide

33. Id. (citations omitted).
34. See WEISSENBERGER, supra note 3, § 801.13, at 408.
35. Id. at 412.

36. FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(1)(C) advisory committee's note.
37. 484 U.S. 554 (1988). In Owens, a prior out-of-court identification by
the declarant identified the defendant as his attacker, but due to severe memory
loss caused by the attack, the declarant was unable to remember the events
following the attack. Id. at 556. The Court, in applying the hearsay exemption
of Federal Rule 801(d)(1)(C), found the admission of the identification to be
proper. Id. at 564.
38. Id. at 563-64.
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an in-court identification or testify about details of the events
39
underlying an earlier identification."
In the criminal context, New York's approach to the
admissibility of prior out-of-court identifications is codified in
42
C.P.L. section 60.2540 and section 60.30.41 In People v. Nival,
39. Id. at 563.
40. N.Y. CRiM. PROC. LAw § 60.25 (McKinney 1992). This provision

states:
1. In any criminal proceeding in which the defendant's commission of
an offense is in issue, testimony as provided in subdivision two may be
given by a witness when:
(a) Such witness testifies that:
(i) He observed the person claimed by the people to be the
defendant either at the time and place of the commission of
the offense or upon some other occasion relevant to the case;
and
(ii) On a subsequent occasion he observed, under circumstances
consistent with such rights as an accused person may derive
under the constitution of this state or of the United States, a
person whom he recognized as the same person whom he had
observed on the first or incriminating occasion; and
(iii) He is unable at the proceeding to state, on the basis of present
recollection, whether or not the defendant is the person in
question; and
(b) It is established that the defendant is in fact the person whom the
witness observed and recognized on the second occasion. Such fact
may be established by testimony of another person or persons to
whom the witness promptly declared his recognition on such
occasion.
2. Under circumstances prescribed in subdivision one, such witness may
testify at the criminal proceeding that the person whom he observed and
recognized on the second occasion is the same person whom he
observed on the first or incriminating occasion. Such testimony,
together with the evidence that the defendant is in fact the person whom
the witness observed and recognized on the second occasion, constitutes
evidence in chief.
Id.

41. N.Y. CRiM. PROC. LAW § 60.30 (McKinney 1992). The provision
states:
In any criminal proceeding in which the defendant's commission of an
offense is in issue, a witness who testifies that (a) he observed the
person claimed by the people to be the defendant either at the time and
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the New York Court of Appeals explained and distinguished the
application of these statutes. 43 C.P.L. section 60.30 allows as

'evidence in chief' or substantive evidence. testimony from a
previous extra-judicial identification by a witness who ha, made
an identification at trial. 4 4
In contrast, C.P.L. section 60.25 provides for the admissibility
of a prior identification as substantive evidence "where the
witness, due to lapse of time or change in appearance of the
defendant, cannot make an in-court identification, but has on a

previous occasion identified the defendant. " 45 In this limited
situation, "any other witness may then establish that the
defendant in court is the same person that the eyewitness

identified on the previous occasion." 4 6 The New York Court of
Appeals noted that while the prior identification made by the
eyewitness to the third party is admitted for its substantive value.
the testimony provided by the third party is actually not hearsay

place of the commission of the offense or upon some other occasion
relevant to the case, and (b) on the basis of present recollection, the
defendant is the person in question and (c) on a subsequent occasion he
observed the defendant, under circumstances consistent with such rights
as an accused person may derive under the constitution of this state or of
the United States, and then also recognized him as the same person
whom he had observed on the first or incriminating occasion. may. in
addition to making an identification of the defendant at the criminal
proceeding on the basis of present recollection as the person whom he
observed on the first or incriminating occasion, also describe his
previous recognition of the defendant and testify that the person whom
he observed on such second occasion is the same person whom he had
observed on the first or incriminating occasion. Such testimony
constitutes evidence in chief.
Id.

42. 33 N.Y.2d 391, 396-97, 308 N.E.2d 883, 886, 353 N.Y.S.2d 409.
413 (1974) (holding that a detective was allowed to testify that the victim had
identified the defendant, since the victim could not identify the defendant at
trial).
43. Id. at 395, 308 N.E.2d at 885, 353 N.Y.S.2d at 411-12.
44. Id.
45. la.
46. Id.
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because such third party testimony is offered to prove only that
47
the prior identification was made.
It is apparent that the New York rule substantially comports
with the federal rule on the admissibility of prior out-of-court
identifications by witnesses testifying at trial. While Federal Rule
801(d)(1)(C) does not expressly provide for third party
testimony, both rules support the admissibility of prior
identifications.

47. Id. at 396 n.4, 308 N.E.2d at 885 n.4, 353 N.Y.S.2d at 412 n.4.
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